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Abstract. In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the ef-
fects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of
the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend
on the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender.
We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the
borrower has power that exceeds this threshold, her expected utility must go up
whenever her outside options come down. But if the borrower has less power
than this threshold, her expected payoff must come down with her outside op-
tions. In the former case a deterioration in outside options brought about, say,
by better enforcement, must create a Lorenz improvement in state-contingent
consumption. In particular, borrower consumption rises in all “bad” states in
which loans are taken. In the latter case, in contrast, the borrower’s consump-
tion must decline, at least for all the bad states. These disparate findings within
a single model permit us to interpret existing literature on credit markets in a
unified way.
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21. Introduction
Problems of enforcement are central to the functioning of credit markets. While
the difficulties of ensuring repayment are endemic in all societies, developing coun-
tries are particularly vulnerable. In such countries, there is often little reliance on
a court of law and equally little faith in the ability to seize collateral. Usually, the
main deterrent to default is the threat that no future loans will be forthcoming,
sometimes enhanced by the fear of community sanctions. This constraint often
seriously limits the extent of consumption smoothing individuals have access to.
In this paper, we study how a change in enforcement — or more generally, in the
outside options of a potential defaulter — affects the terms of the credit contract,
as well as equilibrium payoffs. It will turn out that the results crucially depend on
the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender.
In the model that we construct, risk-averse agents borrow from risk-neutral
lenders to smooth their consumption. The terms of such an arrangement must
satisfy the usual participation constraint for the borrower, but there is more. At
any point in the process, the borrower may default on an existing loan. In that
case the borrower is excluded from the current relationship and has access to some
outside option. Any loan arrangement must respect this enforcement constraint. In
many situations of interest (such as the one we study), the enforcement constraint
implies the participation constraint, and it is the former that is binding, while the
latter is slack. We follow an established approach in development economics by
focusing on this case.1
Just which arrangement will prevail depends, of course, on the effective relative
weights afforded to lender and borrower payoffs — on “bargaining power”, to put
it briefly. The main result of this paper establishes that there is a crucial threshold
of relative weights such that if the borrower has power that exceeds this threshold,
her expected utility must go up whenever her outside options come down. But if
the borrower has less power than this threshold, her expected payoff must come
down with her outside options. In particular, the first result holds in a competitive
credit market (where the borrower receives the entire implicit weight), and the
second result applies when the lender is a monopolist (so that the borrower has no
power at all).
While the paper contains a detailed account, some brief intuition may be helpful.
A deterioration of outside options relaxes the enforcement constraint and therefore
improves the set of contractual terms which can be credibly upheld by a borrower.
1See, e.g., Dutta et al. (1989) and Banerjee and Ghatak (2004) for models of tenancy contracts
with eviction threats, Bardhan (1983), Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) and Mukherjee and Ray (1995)
for theories of permanent labor with termination threats, and Ghosh et al. for a survey of credit
market models with imperfect enforcement. In all these literatures, the enforcement constraint
is binding while the participation constraint (though met) is not.
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When all power lies with the lender, the improvement in the constraint permits
her to seize the additional surplus that is thus generated, pushing the borrower’s
equilibrium utility downwards. In contrast, when all power lies with the borrower,
the opposite is true: the borrower seizes the newly generated surplus, and her
utility must rise. Oddly enough, this second observation — seemingly the more
counterintuitive — is the easier of the two to establish formally.2
The findings also have implications for the shape of the consumption function.
When borrowers “have the power”, a deterioration in outside options brought
about, say, by better punishment opportunities, must create a Lorenz improvement
in state-contingent consumption. In particular, borrower consumption rises in
all “bad” states in which loans are taken. In contrast, when lenders have the
power, a borrower’s consumption must decline, at least for all the bad states.
While inequality comparisons are decidedly ambiguous now, there is certainly no
presumption of a Lorenz improvement.
These findings permit us to re-read existing literature on credit markets in a
unified way. In particular, we focus on two papers. Krueger and Perri (2003)
attempt to explain why consumption inequality in the United States has declined
despite a rise in income inequality. They do so using a model of credit with
enforcement constraints in which borrowers have all the power. In the specific
case they consider, borrower payoffs improve, especially in bad states. Kranton
and Swamy (1999) also study credit markets, this time in the nineteenth century
Bombay Deccan. They view the introduction of the British court system in India
as an improvement in enforcement technology, and describe its effect on credit
markets. Their main observation — that borrower payoffs decline in bad states,
stands in apparent contrast to the Krueger-Perri observation. We show that these
two papers are fundamentally looking at the same issue, but arrives at contrasting
results because the implicit assumptions on bargaining power are different in the
two cases (yet in our opinion, correct in each of their specific contexts).
2. Credit Markets with Self-Enforcement
2.1. Basic Model. There are two types of agents, lenders and potential borrowers.
At any date, a borrower receives income y that assumes one of a finite number of
conceivable values in some set S. Value y is realized with probability p(y). Income
realizations are independent and identical, over people as well as dates.
Lenders are risk-neutral. Their payoff is simply discounted expected profit. All
borrowers have the same one-period von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
2If the borrower has all the power, then all improved surplus must accrue to her, and that is
simply the end of the matter. When the lender has all the power, it is still conceivable that the
new contract, which raises lender payoff, might serendipitously raise borrower payoffs as well. As
we shall see, ruling this out requires a nontrivial argument.
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u defined on consumption. Their lifetime (discount-normalized) expected utility
from any date t onwards is given by
(1− δ)E
∞∑
j=0
δju(ct+j),
where u is increasing, smooth and strictly concave, and δ ∈ (0, 1). Individuals have
access to a credit market to smooth consumption. The combination of loans that
an individual receives or repayment that he makes when his income is y results in
a level of consumption c(y). A consumption allocation c is a nonnegative vector of
consumptions {c(y)}y∈S.
2.2. Self-Enforcing Allocations. At any point of time, a borrower might choose
to avoid the specified repayment y − c(y) and consequently default on the loan.
So we study loan arrangements that are self-enforcing. To this end, consider the
expected continuation utility u of a borrower if she reneges on her credit arrange-
ment. In general, this will depend on the outside option of the borrower as she
looks for other credit relationships, diminished by any sanctions or punishments
that the lender can credibly mete out.
Say that an allocation c is self-enforcing if for all y ∈ S,
(1) (1− δ)u(c(y)) + δ
∑
y
p(y)u(c(y)) ≥ (1− δ)u(y) + δu.
2.3. The Allocation of Power. Turn now to a detailed description of the credit
relationship between a lender and borrower. The specific arrangement that they
will agree on depends on the allocation of power between them. Let uo be the
utility the borrower can expect if he does not agree on an allocation with this
lender. uo is just the same as u (see above) if no additional punishment can be
meted out for default; otherwise it is larger by precisely the utility value of such
punishment.
We identify the allocation of power with the implicit welfare weights on the
utility of the two parties, which in turn determines the allocation of the joint
surplus. Equivalently, one might identify the allocation of power with the choice
of a particular point on the (constrained) utility possibility frontier.
Neither shorthand does justice to the actual process which might mirror the
allocation of power, such as the offers and counteroffers made. Nevertheless, we do
not need this extra structure as long as we agree that “more power” to an agent
slides us up the constrained frontier in the direction of that agent, or pivots relative
welfare weights in her direction.
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At the same time, this general interpretation of “bargaining power” is open to
scrutiny. Indeed, one might identify two notions of power in contractual relation-
ships. The first is given by outside options: the payoff an agent can obtain if she
were to walk away from the current relationship. This is essentially a market-based
notion of power. But the conjunction of outside options to either party may or may
not be sufficient to pin down the payoffs to both parties in a bilateral relationship.
It would be, if all markets were frictionless. But when there are frictions (as in
the model we study), there is a nontrivial expanse of the utility possibility frontier
which lies between the extremes specified by outside options. In this case a bilateral
notion of power must be invoked to select a point on the frontier. To be sure, such
power may also be mediated by market forces in general. For instance, free entry
on the lender’s side may force all the available surplus to go to the borrower. Or if
the lender is effectively a local monopoly, a Diamond-style argument might allow
her to reap the available surplus. Our implicit welfare weights attempt to capture
— admittedly in a starkly reduced-form way — this second notion of power.3
Denote by α ∈ [0, 1] the welfare weight on the borrower’s utility. In keeping
with our earlier discussion, free entry of lenders (with the zero-profit constraint)
corresponds to the case where all the power is given to the borrowers (α = 1), while
in the pure monopoly borrowers receives a zero implicit welfare weight relative to
lenders (α = 0).
Given some allocation of power α, the following constrained optimization prob-
lem describes the appropriate outcome:
[The α-Problem.]
(2) max
c
W (u, uo) ≡ α
∑
y
p(y)u(c(y)) + (1− α)
∑
y
p(y)[y − c(y)]
subject to the enforcement constraint (1) and the participation constraints∑
y
p(y)[y − c(y)] ≥ 0(3) ∑
y
p(y)u(c(y)) ≥ uo(4)
For any α, this problem has a unique solution (see Lemma 1 in appendix) that
we shall denote c∗. The constrained optimal allocation c∗ is characterized by the
first-order conditions
(5)
λ+ 1− α
u′(c(y))
= α+ β + (1− δ) γy
p(y)
+ δ
∑
y′
γy′
3The concluding section provides some brief bibliographical notes on recent literature that
emphasizes this kind of bargaining power in contractual relationships.
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where λ is the multiplier on the zero-profit condition (3), β the multiplier on
the borrower’s participation constraint (4), and γy the multiplier on the self-
enforcement constraint (1) when realized income is y.
It follows that if no enforcement constraint binds then a borrower’s consumption
is kept constant across states: c(y) = c for all y. The particular consumption level
will be pinned down by either of the participation constraints (the one that binds)
or by the condition u′(c) = (1−α)/α for all y if no participation constraint binds.
When some (but not all) enforcement constraints bind, equation (5) tells us that
consumption is kept constant in all states for which (1) is not binding. Using this
information, it is easy to see that if (1) is binding at some value of y, it must be
binding for all higher income realizations, so that — using (1) again — equilibrium
consumption has a “flat” component for low incomes and an increasing component
at all higher incomes.
Denote by v ≡ ∑y p(y)u(c∗(y)) the borrower’s expected utility from c∗ and by
pi ≡∑y p(y)[y − c∗(y)] the corresponding expected profit for the lender.
3. An Improvement in Enforcement
We now turn to the consequences of an improvement in enforcement capabilities.
Such an improvement may simply be viewed as lowering u, so that the utility cost
of a deviation is now higher. To be sure, if such a change stems from a change in
the borrower’s outside options, uo will change as well.
We study both the effects on borrower payoffs as well as on the form of the
equilibrium loan arrangement.
3.1. Borrower Payoffs. Consider, then, an exogenous decrease in u. The problem
is only interesting when at least one of the enforcement constraints binds, and there
is a non-trivial credit arrangement c∗(y) 6= y for at least some y. We only consider
such cases.
The problem is also uninteresting if the participation constraint of the borrower
binds, for then the payoff of the borrower is simply uo by definition. Fortunately,
we know that if punishments are small the borrower’s participation constraint will
be superseded by the self-enforcement constraints, and will not bind.
We claim that there is a borrower’s “power threshold” below which v must
decrease with u, while above that threshold v and u move in opposite directions.
Proposition 1. Assume that the borrower’s participation constraint is not binding,
but that one or more of her enforcement constraints do bind. Then there exists α̂
such that if u decreases, v increases for all α ≥ α̂, stays constant when α = α̂ and
decreases for all α < α̂.
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Proof. Below, we study two cases, one in which the participation constraint of
the lender does not bind and the other in which it does. Subsequently, we connect
these cases to the various values of α.
Because the α-problem has a unique solution for every α, this solution must be
continuous in the parameter u. It therefore suffices to consider only those changes
in u such that exactly the same constraints bind before and after. Once this is done,
the general assertion follows by simply piecing together the local effects deduced
below.
At any state y for which the enforcement constraint is not binding, the first
order conditions (5) tell us that
(6)
λ+ 1− α
u′(c(y))
= α+ δ
∑
y′
γy′ ,
remembering that the borrower’s participation constraint is not binding by as-
sumption.
Now suppose that the lender’s participation constraint is not binding, so that
λ = 0. We claim that in this case, a decrease in u results in a decrease in v.
Lemma 2 in the appendix shows that
∑
y′ γy′ is increasing in u. [Intuitively, the
enforcement constraints become tighter overall as post-deviation options improve.]
In conjunction with (6), this implies that in any non-binding state y, c(y) decreases
upon a decline in u.
Now suppose, contrary to our claim, that v has not decreased. Consider any
state y in which the enforcement constraint (1) is binding. Recall that constraint
(1), which we write here as
(1− δ)[u(y)− u(c(y))] = δ[v − u].
Because v is presumed not to have decreased, v − u must have increased. We see,
then, that u(y)− u(c(y)) increases for all these binding states, which is just to say
that c(y) must decline for all such states.
It follows that consumption decreases in all states, whether or not the constraint
is binding. But this contradicts our supposition that v has not decreased, and
completes the proof of the claim in this case.
Next, consider a situation in which the lender’s profit constraint is binding.
In this case, average consumption equals average income. Since a decrease in u
strictly relaxes any binding enforcement constraint and profit stays constant, the
borrower’s expected utility v must go up.
Now we connect the two cases to values of α. Lemma 3 in the appendix does just
that: it shows that if for some α the lender’s participation constraint binds then it
does also bind for any higher α. To put the final arguments in place, denote as α
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the threshold α such that for all α ≥ α the lender’s participation constraint binds.
We saw that, for any α < α, v decreases and pi increases following a reduction
in u. It follows that, if the non-negative constraint was not binding before the
decrease in u, it won’t be binding after. We also saw that if the profit constraint
binds before and after the decrease in u, then v increases. Hence, there remains
one possibility to study: for some values of α the non-negative profit constraint
binds before but not after the decrease in u.
In this case, v can increase or decrease. However, given Lemma 3 and the fact
that the Pareto frontier is smooth and strictly concave, there exists α̂ such that
the following is true. If u decreases, v increases for all α ≥ α̂, stays constant at
α = α̂ and decreases for all α < α̂. It is easy to see that 0 < α̂ < 1.
The effect of a decrease in u is illustrated in Figure 1. The two constrained
payoff frontiers correspond to outside options u and u′, and of course the frontier
with the lower outside option lies further out from the origin. The welfare weight
α is captured by the common slope of the parallel straight lines, which track
the outcomes before and after the change. In the case considered in Figure 1, the
lender’s participation constraint is not binding. Proposition 1 proves that a decline
in u in this case must lead to a decrease in borrower payoffs, and this is captured
in the diagram.
v
v'
' Lender’s Payoff
Bo
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Figure 1. Effect of a Decline in u on Payoffs
At the same time, notice that the efficient frontier does not flatten out entirely
as it hits the vertical axis. For values of α that fall short of the absolute value of
this slope at the axis, the lender’s profit constraint must bind. It is now easy to
see that borrower payoffs must climb following a reduction in u.
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To close this section, we comment on the assumption that consumption alloca-
tions are stationary and history-independent. Suppose that we consider history-
dependent allocations: to what extent do the results continue to apply? It is easy
to see that borrower payoffs must still rise with a fall in outside options (when
α = 1). Moreoever, when the lender has all the power, the participation constraint
will typically bite with history-dependent contracts, so the borrower’s payoff will
naturally follow her reservation utility downwards. These two observations sug-
gest that our results extend fully to more complex arrangements, though a formal
exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.2. The Consumption Profile. Now we explore a related but distinct question:
what happens to the consumption profile when post-deviation outside options de-
cline for the borrower? As in the previous section, we take it that the borrower’s
participation constraint is slack but that one or more of her enforcement constraints
do bind.
Proposition 2. For any α ≥ α̂, state-contingent borrower consumption becomes
“smoother” following a decrease in u: it increases for an interval of lower incomes,
and decreases for the remaining interval of higher incomes.
Proof. We know that for α ≥ α̂, v increases or stays constant. Now consider a
decrease in u from u to u′ < u. Let c and c′ be the respective constrained optimal
allocations, and v and v′ be the borrowers’ expected utility under these allocations.
Pick any value of income, say y1, such that c
′(y1) ≥ c(y1). Then, because
v′ − u′ > v − u, (1) cannot be binding under the new parameters. From our
discussion at the end of Section 2.3, it follows that (1) must not bind either (in
the new situation) for all y ≤ y1. Because consumptions are equalized over all
nonbinding states, we may conclude that
(7) c′(y) = c′(y1) for all y ≤ y1.
At the same time, we know (again see Section 2.3) that the consumption function
is nondecreasing, so that c(y1) ≥ c(y) for all y ≤ y1. Combining this information
with (7), we conclude that
(8) c′(y) ≥ c(y) for all y ≤ y1.
However, it cannot be that c′(y) ≥ c(y) for every y, for then no enforcement
constraint would bind for the borrower. So, if interpreting y1 above as the largest
income for which c′(y1) ≥ c(y1), then higher realizations of income must exist and
c′(y) < c(y) for all such realizations.
The comparison of the two consumption functions implied by Proposition 2 is
illustrated in Figure 2. The consumption profile is smoother when borrowers have
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sufficient bargaining power. When the reduction in u stems from better enforce-
ment capabilities, every measure of consumption inequality that is compatible with
the Lorenz criterion must necessarily register a decline. Indeed, this is true of any
decline in u that does not stem from a change in the underlying stochastic process
that generates incomes.
To be sure, if the change in outside options stems from some change in the income
generating process itself (such as greater income uncertainty), then Proposition 2
does not necessarily translate into Lorenz-comparisons of consumption before and
after. We return to this point in Section 4.1 below.
c
y
Figure 2. Effect of a Decrease in u on Consumption
The smoothing result stands in stark contrast to situations in which the lender
has the power.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the borrower’s participation constraint does not bind.
For any α < α̂, state-contingent borrower consumption must decline in every “low
income” state, following a decrease in u. That is, consumption must fall in all
states in which the enforcement constraint was not binding to start with.
Proof. We have α < α̂, so that u and v move in the same direction and the
lender’s participation constraint does not bind. Consequently, we may write the
first-order constraint (5) as
(9)
1− α
u′(c(y))
= α+ δ
∑
y′
γy′ ,
(remembering that the borrower’s participation constraint also does not bind, by
assumption).
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Lemma 2 in the appendix shows that
∑
y′ γy′ decreases along with u. Therefore
(9) immediately shows us that c′(y) < c(y) for all nonbinding states.
This and the first order conditions in (5) imply that, in any state y in which the
enforcement constraint (1) does not bind, c(y) decreases following a decline in u.
Just as Proposition 1 shows that borrower payoff may move in different directions
depending on the allocation of power, Propositions 2 and 3 highlight the contrast in
consumption profiles. In the former case, a lower outside option gives a “powerful”
borrower greater credibility and allows her to smooth her consumption better. In
the latter case, a lower outside option gives a “powerful” lender a greater ability to
extract surplus from the borrower, so that she is protected less in bad states. [To
our understanding, the change in consumption under “good” states is ambiguous.]
4. Two Applications
4.1. Income and Consumption Inequality in the United States. Krueger
and Perri (2003) — KP hereafter — investigate the relationship between the cross-
sectional distribution of income and consumption in the United States between
1980 and 1997. They present evidence that the Gini coefficient of after-tax labor
income increased while the consumption Gini remained roughly constant.
KP observe that there are two ways to interpret the cross-sectional income dis-
tribution; one, as persistent income differences across individuals or households,
and two, as an increase in the spread or volatility of incomes. They adopt the latter
view, and use the increased spread in the agent’s income distribution as a possi-
ble explanation for the consumption observations. They use a specific example of
risk-sharing without commitment. Consider pairs of agents whose endowments are
perfectly negatively correlated and take on just two values: h and `, with h > ` > 0.
The agents have constant relative risk aversion and, across pairs, their income dis-
tributions are multiples of each other. In this case, when risk-sharing is not perfect,
KP show that an increase in the dispersion in the agents’ income increases both the
Gini measure of income inequality and the level of risk-sharing among the agents.
An increase in income dispersion can then result in a simultaneous decrease in the
consumption Gini and an increase in the income Gini.
The KP argument easily translates into our more general setting, in a situation
where credit markets are competitive. In that case lenders always receive the
competitive profit (zero by normalization), so that α is effectively 1. Then a
reduction in post-deviation outside options increases borrower’s payoff and smooths
out consumption relative to income realizations.
To be sure — and as we have noted above — the smoothing of consumption
relative to income may not imply a fall in consumption inequality if the income
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process itself changes. But as the following discussion shows, one can go a bit
further.
Consider amean-preserving spread in the income distribution in which the lowest
possible income realization — call it y — decreases by a small amount  > 0, while
the other income realizations are increased by dy for y > y. Maintain means:∑
y>y p(y)dy = p(y). [Notice that when income takes on just two values: y with
probability p and y with probability (1 − p), then there is only one possible such
change: a decrease in y by an  compensated by an increase in y by  (1− p)/p.] If
the post-deviation outside option is given by autarky, then u equals
∑
y p(y)u(y),
and it surely declines.
Assume that a nontrivial borrowing scheme exists to start with (i.e., c 6= y).
Now consider the deviation payoffs in each state with income y. They are given by
(10) (1− δ)u(y) + δ
∑
z
p(z)u(z).
For states other than the one with lowest income, the direction in which these
expressions change is ambiguous. Although continuation utility declines, incomes
in states other than y increase. However, Lemma 4 in the Appendix shows that for
small  there is a mean-preserving spread in income as described such that every
expression of the form (10) must decline with the change.
Therefore all enforcement constraints are relaxed, and such a mean-preserving
spread has the same effect as an improvement in enforcement in the sense of Section
3. Moreover because we are in the competitive case with zero lender profit, ex-
pected consumption equals expected income (which remains unchanged under the
mean-preserving spread). Now we can follows the same steps in the proof of Propo-
sition 2 to show that consumption patterns must display a Lorenz-improvement.
An increase in income inequality — as measured by any Lorenz consistent inequal-
ity measure — results in a decrease in consumption inequality.
4.2. Moneylending and Legal Enforcement in the Bombay Deccan. Kran-
ton and Swamy (1999) — KS hereafter — provide evidence that moneylenders in
the nineteenth century Bombay Deccan were essentially local monopolists. Initially,
they had little or no recourse to legal enforcement of debts. But the introduction
of civil courts in colonial India changed that. In particular, it constituted an im-
provement in enforcement technology in credit markets. KS go on to argue that
this institutional change resulted in a lower payoffs to borrowers, at least in bad
states, and caused widespread social unrest. Here we have an instance of a change
that is essentially the same as the one in KP, yet the effect of that change is very
different.
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Our model traces this difference to the implicit allocation of power in the two
scenarios. In KP the market is assumed to be competitive, with a constant-profit
condition imposed on lenders. In KS lenders are local monopolists. Proposition
3 in Section 3.2 shows that indeed an improvement in enforcement must reduce
borrower consumption in all nonbinding states, in sharp contrast to the result
obtained in Proposition 2. Indeed, we show in Proposition 1 that we can actually
sign the effect on the unconditional expected utility of such an institutional change,
not just the utility conditional on bad states. While KS do not make such a
claim, this possibility is not entirely without foundation. In this context, Dube’s
(1998) account of the 1856 British settlement of land property rights in Awadh is
instructive:
Though pre-British Awadh was far from idyllic . . . the bulk of histor-
ical evidence indicates that the condition of the peasantry worsened
greatly under colonial rule. The crucial difference between the two
periods was that in the pre-colonial agrarian system rights to land
and its produce were far more dispersed, restraining the zamindars ’
depredations. In contrast, under the British the zamindars acquired
near-absolute power. While during the semi-feudal system prevail-
ing earlier, they had to rely on force and social hierarchy to wring
revenue from the peasantry, they now enjoyed ownership of virtu-
ally every inch of arable land, the legal power to fix rents and eject
tenants, and the backing of the colonial state power.
So is entirely reasonable to suppose that not only do borrower payoffs come down
in bad states, they may come down unconditionally. That said, KS’s study of the
Bombay Deccan is an appropriate context to bring up the question of endogenous
bargaining power. Absolute rights to land may not extend to absolute rights to a
pool of borrowers, though the presence of interlinked contracts certainly suggests
a strong connection. Therefore we briefly comment on the issue of lender entry.
Consider a credit market with a monopolist lender and a fall in u. This improve-
ment in enforcement increases the profit of a monopolist lender. Consequently, as
KS argue, by making the enforcement technology available to anyone willing to
be a moneylender, fresh entry may be encouraged. Whether such entry would, in
fact, occur and would then nullify the predicted decline in borrowers’ utility will
depend on the precise nature of inter-lender competition.
For instance, if there is “pure” Bertrand competition (or limited product dif-
ferentiation) following entry, lender profits would fall substantially. In this case,
our assertions regarding a decline in unconditional expected utility will need to be
qualified. If, on the other hand, there are either fixed cost of entry or substantial
niche markets for credit, the decreased expected utility prediction is one that we
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can be more confident about.4 Note, however, that even fresh entry is consistent
with the strong version of our story provided that there are matching frictions as
in Diamond (1971).
5. Concluding Remarks
We study a model of credit markets with limited enforcement, where our main
focus is on the bargaining power of the lender relative to the borrower. We show
that a change in outside options for the borrower (brought about, say, through
a change in the technology of enforcement) has sharply different implications for
borrower payoffs and consumption patterns, depending on the allocation of power.
In particular, we show that if the relative bargaining power of borrowers exceeds
some threshold value, their expected payoffs increase following an improvement in
enforcement. In contrast, for power below this threshold level, better enforcement
lowers borrower payoffs.
A similar contrast applies to borrower consumption patterns. In the “high
power” case, consumptions undergo a Lorenz improvement, rising in bad states
and falling in good states. Roughly the opposite happens in the “low power” case:
borrower consumption in the bad states must fall, though the outcome for good
states is ambiguous.
We then show that our model provides a unified reading of different findings in
the literature on credit markets with limited enforcement. We illustrate this with
a discussion of two papers: Krueger and Perri (2003) on consumption inequality in
the United States, and Kranton and Swamy (1999) on credit markets in nineteenth
century India.
Our paper is related to a literature that emphasizes the different implications
of variations in bargaining power. For instance, viewed as property or control
rights, bargaining power lies at the heart of the incomplete contracts literature
pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), among oth-
ers. In the context of a principal-agent relationship, Mookherjee (1997) shows that
more power to an incentive-constrained agent increases economic surplus (see also
Galasso (2004)). Mookherjee and Ray (2002) show, in the context of a dynamic
principal-agent relationship with wealth accumulation, that variations in bargain-
ing power lead to substantially different long-run distributions of wealth. Galasso
(2004) shows that in contractual relationships with externalities across different
agents, final outcomes depend crucially on the power of agents relative to the prin-
cipal. The current exercise, apart from its distinct focus on credit markets, is
4See, e.g., Ray and Sengupta (1989), Floro and Yotopoulos (1991) and Mansuri (1997) on
interlinked contracts and market segmentation.
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methodologically somewhat different in that it studies the differential impact of a
change in parameters (the outside options), depending on bargaining power.
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In part of what follows, we consider an obvious extension of the α-problem with
state-specific post-deviation utilities u = {u(y)}∀y. Then modified enforcement
constraints would read as
(11) (1− δ)u(c(y)) + δv ≥ (1− δ)u(y) + δu(y).
Call this the extended α-problem.
Lemma 1. For any α ∈ [0, 1], the extended α-problem (and in particular, the
original α-problem) has a unique solution.
Proof. The objective (2) is concave in the consumption vector c, and strictly so
for all α > 0. Moreover, it is easy to check that the set of consumption vectors Γ
that satisfy the participation constraint of the lenders and borrowers (3) and (4)
and the “extended” enforcement constraints (11) is convex. So we are done when
α > 0.
Moreover, when (4) or (11) binds — as they must when α = 0 — Γ is strictly
convex. To see this, take two distinct vectors of consumption c1 and c2 in Γ, and
let cθ = θc1 + (1 − θ)c2 for any θ ∈ (0, 1). Define vi =
∑
y p(y)u(ci(y)), pii =∑
y p(y)[y− ci(y)] for i ∈ {1, 2}, piθ =
∑
y p(y)[y− cθ(y)] and vθ =
∑
y p(y)u(cθ(y)).
Since c1 and c2 satisfy the borrower’s participation constraint θv1+(1−θ)v2 ≥ uo.
By strict concavity of the utility function vθ > θv1 + (1 − θ)v2, so the borrowers’
participation constraint is not binding at cθ. Using the very same argument we can
show that that no enforcement constraint can hold with equality at cθ. Therefore
at α = 0, we have a strictly convex constraint set, and the proof is complete.
Lemma 2. In the α-problem, if γ(y) > 0 for some y, then
∑
y γ(y) strictly in-
creases in u.
Proof. Consider an extended α-problem with state-contingent outside options.
Denote by M(u) the maximized value of the objective in (2) subject to (3), (4),
and (11).
Consider two distinct vectors of state specific reservation utilities, u1 and u2.
Let c1 and c2 be the two corresponding constrained optimal allocations (unique by
Lemma 1). For any θ ∈ (0, 1), let uθ = θu1 + (1− θ)u2 and cθ = θc1 + (1− θ)c2.
Using the strict concavity of the utility function, it is possible to see that no
enforcement or participation constraint of the borrower binds under the allocation
uθ.
Now, if some borrower enforcement or participation constraint were in fact bind-
ing in either of the two “starting” problems, then uθ cannot exhibit full smoothing.
In this case, borrower utility can clearly be improved relative to uθ, while keeping
lender payoff constant. It follows that if α > 0,
(12) M(uθ) > θM(u1) + (1− θ)M(u2).
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If α = 0, then it is trivial to improve lender utility (relative to uθ) while continuing
to respect all borrower constraints, as they were not binding at uθ. So in any case,
(12) must hold. But the strict concavity implicit in (12) tells us that if we restrict
ourselves to the special case in which u = (u, . . . , u), then
(13)
dM(u, . . . , u)
du
is decreasing in u,
assuming that γ(y) is strictly positive for at least one state y in the α-problem
described by (u, . . . , u).
However,
(14)
dM(u, . . . , u)
du
=
∑
y
∂M(u, . . . , u)
∂u(y)
= −
∑
y
γ(y).
Combining (13) and (14), the proof is complete.
Lemma 3. The lender’s payoff for some allocation of power α ∈ [0, 1] is no smaller
than its payoff for any allocation of power α′ ≥ α.
Proof. Take two values α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1) with α2 ≥ α1. Let (v1, pi1) and (v2, pi2)
be the corresponding sets of borrower-lender payoff pairs. Since the feasible set is
unchanged, a simple revealed preference argument tells us that
α1v1 + (1− α1)pi1 ≥ α1v2 + (1− α1)pi2
α2v2 + (1− α2)pi2 ≥ α2v1 + (1− α2)pi1
Summing these two inequalities and dividing by (α2 − α1), we obtain:
[pi1 − pi2] ≥ [v1 − v2]
This inequality must imply that pi1 ≥ pi2. For if not, then pi1 < pi2 and so v1 < v2,
which contradicts (constrained) Pareto-optimality of solutions to the α-problem.
We say that an allocation c is non-trivial if c 6= y. Consider a mean-preserving
spread in the income distribution in which the lowest possible income realization —
call it y — decreases by a small amount  > 0, while the other income realizations
are increased by dy for y > y such that
∑
y>y p(y)dy = p(y).
Lemma 4. If credit markets are competitive and the initial allocation is non-trivial,
then there exists a mean-preserving spread in the income distribution such that
(1− δ)u(y) + δ
∑
z
p(z)u(z)
declines for all y, provided that  is small enough.
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Proof. Assume that the constrained optimal allocation is non-trivial, c∗ 6= y, and
let t∗ = y− c∗. First notice that the expected utility Eu(t) ≡∑y p(y)u(y − t(y))
and
V (y, t) ≡ (1− δ)u(y − t(y)) + δEu(t)
are strictly concave in t. Moreover, notice that Eu(0) = u and V (y, 0) = (1 −
δ)u(y) + δu. And at t∗, we know that Eu(t∗) ≥ u and V (y, t∗) ≥ (1− δ)u(y) + δu.
It follows that, for any λ ∈ (0, 1), the borrower’s participation constraint (4) and
enforcement constraints (1) hold with a strict inequality at cλ = y − λt∗. In
addition, the allocation cλ would still satisfy the lender’s participation constraint.
Hence, it must be that, at λ = 0, ∂V (y, λt∗)/∂λ > 0, that is
(15) −(1− δ)u′(y)t∗(y)− δ
∑
s
p(ys)t
∗(ys)u′(ys) > 0
Denoting S+ and S− the sets of state s in which t∗(ys) > 0 and t∗(ys) < 0
respectively, we can rewrite (15) as
−(1− δ)u′(y)t∗(y)− δ
∑
s∈S+
p(ys) t
∗(ys)u′(ys) + δ
∑
s∈S−
p(ys)|t∗(ys)|u′(ys) > 0
The credit market being competitive, we know that
∑
s p(ys)t
∗(ys) = 0 in equi-
librium, so that ∑
s∈S−
p(ys)|t∗(ys)| =
∑
s∈S+
p(ys)t
∗(ys).
Since u′(y) > u′(ys) for all ys > y, it follows that∑
s∈S+
p(ys)t
∗(ys)u′(y) >
∑
s∈S−
p(ys)|t∗(ys)|u′(ys)
Therefore, (15) implies that
(16) −(1− δ)u′(y)t∗(y) + δ
∑
s∈S+
p(ys)t
∗(ys)[u′(y)− u′(ys)] > 0
Now, consider the following change in the income distribution for all state s
dys =
 − t∗(ys)/[∑s′∈S+ p(y′s)t∗(y′s)]0 if
 ys = ys ∈ S+
otherwise
Clearly, this is a mean-preserving spread in income since
∑
s p(ys)dys = 0. More-
over, inequality (16) implies that such mean-preserving spread in income results in
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a decrease in (1− δ)u(y) + δ∑z p(z)u(z) for all y provided that  is small enough.
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